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Abstract
To limit catastrophic damages associated with global warming in excess of 1.5oC
above pre-industrial levels, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has been
unambiguous in its calls for “rapid and far-reaching transitions” in land-use, energy and
industrial systems. However, perceived asymmetry between the significant up-front
costs and relatively abstruse, delayed benefits of climate change mitigation creates
particular challenges for the political favorability of policies to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. As a result, carbon pricing mechanisms overwhelmingly endorsed by
economists across the ideological spectrum have been, with a few notable exceptions,
resoundingly rejected by legislators and political constituencies. Assessment of partisan,
policy design, public opinion, and interest group pressures counteracting momentum
for carbon pricing is critical in the deployment of a politically durable climate change
agenda. This policy-focused communication assesses these dimensions through the
examination of three case studies initially discussed by Barry G. Rabe in “Can We
Price Carbon?” (MIT Press, 2018)—British Columbia’s carbon tax, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the northeast United States, and California’s cap-and-
trade system for GHGs. Drawing on lessons from case studies and applying political
theories to develop Rabe’s analysis, this work synthesizes guiding principles to comment
on the feasibility of a U.S. federal carbon tax within the next five years.
Lost in Translation: Road-
blocks to Carbon Pricing When
Political Economy Decouples
Throughout the later 20th century, market mech-
anisms were championed to great effect in solving
pressing environmental challenges. The Montreal
Protocol enjoyed success in curbing chlorofluo-
rocarbons responsible for ozone depletion at the
international level [1]; sulfur dioxide emissions
trading drastically curtailed effects of acid rain
from industrial pollution in the United States [2];
and durable carbon taxes in fossil fuel-dominated
Nordic economies were upheld as globally applica-
ble [3]. Such achievements of market-based policy
were especially notable in light of parallel short-
comings of the Kyoto Protocol’s command-and-
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control framework to achieve buy-in for legally
binding emissions reduction requirements at the
international level [4]. Touting the virtues of eco-
nomic efficiency and potential to decouple emis-
sions and economic growth through the market,
American policymakers had warmed to the idea
of carbon pricing by the early 2000s, leading to
bi-partisan sentiment that a carbon price could
form a pillar of U.S. national climate policy [5].
The failure of subsequent legislation delivered a
shock to the American political system. Indeed,
recent congressional efforts to promote a national
carbon tax have stalled, with the last major effort
culminating in the failed Waxman-Markey bill of
the early Obama presidency, which was subject
to “pork barrel” politics in the House of Represen-
tatives and was never brought to the Senate floor
for debate [6]. No serious effort to rekindle mo-
mentum toward carbon pricing is expected until
after the conclusion of the Trump presidency, and
even then, prospects remain highly uncertain.
Perhaps these failures are attributable to con-
sumers’ acute awareness to increased prices of
high-carbon goods, or the distributional implica-
tions of environmental taxes, as seen in France’s
gilets jaunes protests. Perhaps a lack of trust
in scientific institutions, heightened partisan po-
larization, formidable opposition from the fos-
sil fuel lobby, and a poisoned public discourse
on environmental issues are to blame. Perhaps
carbon pricing is simply a low-priority item on
an already-packed national agenda, and decision-
makers have instead embraced largely tokenistic
alternatives such as relatively unambitious renew-
able portfolio standards and emissions reduction
goals, hoping to appease environmentally-inclined
constituents. The examination of carbon taxa-
tion in British Columbia, Canada, and American
emissions trading systems in New England and
California reveals the simultaneous operation of
these political barriers, and the need for context-
specific and creative policy techniques to over-
come them. Ultimately, a U.S. federal carbon
tax is found unlikely to emerge amid a diverse
coalition of oppositional forces in the near term,
though the potential to adopt principles from
successful policy formulation and implementation
provide reason for cautious optimism over longer
time horizons.
The Case of British Columbia’s
Carbon Tax
Kingdon (1984) proposes that the “window of
opportunity” for major legislation opens condi-
tionally upon the presence of political alignment,
coherence of policy ideas, a clearly defined prob-
lem, and committed entrepreneurs to see pol-
icy through to fruition [7, 8]. Kingdon’s multi-
ple streams model of policy adoption is partic-
ularly applicable to the circumstances in which
British Columbia introduced a tax on business
and household carbon emissions in 2008. While
British Columbia’s extraction-oriented economy
appeared an insurmountable obstacle for the
province’s early climate initiatives—with even
left-wing parties opposed to carbon taxes due to
an anticipated backlash—developments in two
critical streams repositioned the balance of feasi-
bility.
Firstly, dynamics of the “problem stream” shifted
as climate change impacts suddenly became ex-
ceptionally palpable, with warmer winters en-
abling the proliferation of the mountain pine bee-
tle (Dendroctonus ponderosae) across millions of
acres of forested wilderness [5]. Over a period of
several seasons, infection of more than 300 million
trees inflicted damages estimated at $6 billion [9].
In addition to the beetles’ economic impact on
regional ecosystem services, incalculable damage
was done to B.C.’s intrinsic and historical place
value and reputation [10]. As an acute, localized
crisis, the beetle infestation captured public imag-
ination in ways that abstract academic literature
on forecasted climate impacts never could. Re-
sulting social pressures served as authorization
for British Columbia’s politicians to take bold
action on climate change [5, 10].
In concurrent events affecting the “politics
stream,” Premier Gordon Campbell became
uniquely positioned to push an ambitious carbon
tax through B.C.’s center-right controlled legis-
lature. Facing a reelection fight in the wake of
personal political scandal, Campbell understood
that pushing an audacious carbon tax could of-
fer him both a signature policy item and critical
political cover [5]. Drawing on the prodigious
experience of his inner circle led by Finance Min-
ister Carole Taylor, Campbell expertly navigated
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the fraught landscape of carbon tax policy de-
sign—efficiency advancing simple, robust legisla-
tion before intra- or inter-party opposition could
mobilize. Campbell’s ingenuity allowed the tax
to pass over left-wing opposition, which had ex-
pressed concern about the policy’s potential to
burden low income populations during a time of
high gas prices [11]. Growing public and business
popularity of tax rebates known as “carbon divi-
dends”—which combat regressivity by distribut-
ing all revenues in uniform annual payments back
to households—has since sustained the legislation
despite repeated left-wing “Axe the Tax” cam-
paigns [11, 12].
The British Columbia case therefore points to
a two-prong approach for broader applicability.
It is first necessary to consider how to catalyze
social momentum to act on climate change (either
through direct impacts or enhanced messaging);
public pressures must then be seized upon by
talented policy entrepreneurs.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative as an Act of Political
Mimicry
Political scientist Herbert Simon’s theory of
bounded rationality suggests that decision-
making by political actors on complex issues is
often inhibited by temporal and cognitive limi-
tations [13]. In this way, legislative outputs are
often irreconcilable with the conclusions of ratio-
nal decision theory, a favored tool of economic
analysis [13]. Policymakers are well aware of such
personal limitations and rarely lose sight of how
an unpopular decision might impact a future re-
election bid. As such, legislators often seek to es-
tablish a “consensus in the field of forces”—relying
on a range of exogenous inputs to guide their per-
sonal beliefs on a particular course of action [14].
Perhaps no input is more influential than the
voting behavior of trusted colleagues; when like-
minded decision-makers act as a bloc on collective
interests, they position themselves to reap com-
munal benefits while avoiding political damage
associated with fringe votes [15].
It is exactly the same politics of mutual inter-
est and safety in numbers that underlie the Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-
and-trade system shared across the interwoven
economies of ten New England states, represent-
ing 7% of aggregate U.S. CO2 emissions [16].
What began as a single-state emissions trading
system in New Hampshire was transferable across
jurisdictions of similar political ideology and de-
mographic composition. In this way, RGGI states
successfully captured the benefits of learning-by-
doing, capitalizing on collective experience to
overcome informational and administrative barri-
ers and build strong public support for the carbon
market prior to its entry into effect in 2009 [5].
RGGI capitalizes on a well-established framework
of regional cooperation through joint quarterly
emissions allowance auctions, while respecting
participating states’ independent regulatory tech-
niques and revenue structures [5]. Several as-
pects of RGGI’s policy design have been crucial
in the program’s durability. First, RGGI is nar-
rowly focused to target carbon emissions from
the electricity sector; the restricted scope of the
initiative (i.e. compared to British Columbia’s
multi-sectoral tax structure) has produced effec-
tive mitigation results while simplifying neces-
sary oversight and limiting broad political re-
sistance [17]. Indeed, despite RGGI’s narrow
regulation of power plants with capacities of at
least 25 megawatts—fewer than 200 facilities in
total—emissions from in-state electricity gener-
ation decreased by 20% between 2012 and 2018,
while electricity sales remained virtually constant
[16]. Additionally, by encouraging the reinvest-
ment of revenues in energy efficiency programs
and renewable energy technology development,
RGGI states have demonstrated a transparent
linkage between emissions trading costs and con-
crete benefits [18].
The resulting program is thus politically self-
sustaining due to its carefully cultivated juris-
dictional alliances, simple and intuitive market
approach within a limited power sector context,
and transparent flow of money and information
into tangible climate solutions. The RGGI case
may therefore serve as proof of concept for the
scale-up of simple, effective market-based policies
that minimize administrative costs and leverage
collaborative governance to aggressively target
“low-hanging fruit” emissions reductions in de-
carbonizing the grid. Indeed, by eschewing a
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grandiose, complex policy vision, New England
has quietly positioned itself at the forefront of
U.S. national climate policy.
The Case of California’s Cap-
and-trade Program
California has, for decades, cultivated its image
as a national standard-bearer on environmental
issues; the state’s longstanding bi-partisan ideo-
logical embrace of cap-and-trade is no exception,
representing a clear indication of desire to lead
on climate [19]. However, examination of the
fallout from California’s cap-and-trade legislation
since its implementation in 2012 yields mixed
conclusions, suggesting political consensus to be
inconsequential in the absence of prudent policy
forethought and planning [5].
Notably, the California case does not call into
question the effectiveness of cap-and-trade as an
emissions reduction strategy. The centerpiece
of California’s ambitious climate goals to reduce
GHG emissions by 40% from a 1990 base year by
2030, the state’s cap-and-trade system, despite pe-
riods of volatility, has achieved GHG abatement
as intended [20]. The California Air Resources
Board, which administers and enforces the pro-
gram, notes that emissions from regulated entities
are on track to decline by over 16% between 2013
and 2020.
Building on RGGI’s electricity sector focus, Cali-
fornia’s program has generated a substantial rev-
enue pool—in excess of $1 billion per year—from
the auction of emissions permits spanning power,
industrial, and transportation sectors [5]. How-
ever, revenue generation is not sufficient to en-
sure a successful market mechanism: to be self-
perpetuating, revenues must be disbursed in an
open, unambiguous, and socially admissible man-
ner. It is in this phase that California has hit a
political stumbling block; failure to prearrange an
acceptable revenue scheme has precipitated com-
peting political factions and wide-ranging influ-
ence campaigns to secure funding for innumerable
(worthy) causes [21]. Rather than unite stakehold-
ers around a cooperative vision of mitigation in
the likeness of RGGI, California’s cap-and-trade
has provoked contention and the erosion of trust
among statewide environmental alliances. Specifi-
cally, dueling proposals calling for investments in
clean transportation, residential energy efficiency
programs, and waste management have divided
and confused community and NGO partners, un-
dermining the policy’s public appeal [21].
In this capacity, California’s eagerness to enact
legislation without specifying future implications
has, in retrospect, proven rash and potentially
counterproductive. As an alternative, Governor
Jerry Brown has instead scored easy political
victories penning relatively vague, symbolic envi-
ronmental commitments—including recent legis-
lation to convert California entirely to renewable
energy by 2045 [5]. This case underscores the
need for a defined vision of policy performance
to complement initial adoptability if substantive
change is to endure.
Will We See a U.S. Federal Car-
bon Price in Five Years?
Monumental challenges ingrained in the modern
American political system will confront any mean-
ingful near-term federal carbon pricing effort. As
postulated by Kraft, congress has the necessary
institutional capacity to study modern environ-
mental problems but grossly lacks the cooper-
ative mindset to prioritize of long-term public
well-being over short term partisan political gains
[15]. Such polarization reflects deep divisions
in public opinion on climate change; fewer than
70% of Americans agree there is solid evidence
of warming temperatures [22]. These conditions
make the probability of durable federal carbon
pricing legislation in the next five years extremely
unlikely, however, successful carbon prices have
often emerged from seemingly disadvantageous
circumstances. Lessons from British Columbia,
RGGI, and California dictate a series of prereq-
uisites for any federal carbon price to overcome
present barriers:
1. Climate change mitigation must be
framed in the national discourse as a
salient policy priority with impending
consequences for individual and social
welfare; a public sense of urgency must
motivate and lend credence to policy en-
trepreneurs. Iterative communication of
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scientific evidence between authorities,
including the IPCC, and local decision-
makers must lend legitimacy and po-
litical license to bold policy responses
[23]. Meanwhile, civil society interven-
tions must remain effective in amplifying
public demand for ambitious action.
2. While no particular model of partisan-
ship appears particularly inclined to suc-
ceed on carbon pricing, mutual trust
among coalition members must enforce
a joint commitment to a given pricing
vision. Broad stakeholder engagement
capable of incorporating local knowledge
into policy planning processes is critical
to facilitating long-term durability [5].
By contrast, undercutting of allies leads
to the fragmentation of support and in-
creases vulnerability to unstable policy
“pendulum swings” from changing admin-
istrations [24].
3. Effective pricing mechanisms, whether
carbon taxation, cap-and-trade, or other-
wise must transparently showcase the ap-
plication of revenues to achieve concrete
social benefits (i.e., carbon dividends, en-
ergy efficiency programs, climate change
adaptation, infrastructure). The federal
government must advance a clear and de-
cisive vision for distribution of revenues,
thereby undermining the politically un-
palatable idea of taxation [5].
Serious pursuit of a national carbon price un-
doubtedly poses an existential threat to a small
subset of political careers, however, failure to en-
gage this issue will relinquish the foremost policy
mechanism to combat an existential threat that
confronts society collectively. While five years
may prove too short a timeline to dissolve in-
grained oppositional interests, successful models
inform the notion that carbon pricing is a worth-
while policy priority within the realm of long-term
feasibility in the United States.
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